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ABSTRACT

Financial Outcomes from Selection
of Insurance Intervals
by
Shana Anderson Stewart, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2018

Major Professor: Dr. Ryan Larsen
Department: Applied Economics

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the potential value of enrolling in rainfall-index
for pasture, rangeland, and forage insurance for Utah producers. A stochastic optimization
model is used to identify the optimal selection of insurance intervals that will provide the
maximum indemnity payments less premiums. Four Utah counties were selected for
analysis. Results indicate that positive returns will occur greater than 60% of the time in
all counties with the selected insurance intervals. The optimal months to insure varied in
each county.
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Financial Outcomes from Selection
of Insurance Intervals
Shana Anderson Stewart

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the potential value of enrolling in rainfall-index
for pasture, rangeland, and forage insurance for Utah producers. A stochastic optimization
model is used to identify the optimal selection of insurance intervals that will provide the
maximum indemnity payments less premiums. Four Utah counties were selected for
analysis. Results indicate that positive returns will occur greater than 60% of the time in
all counties with the selected insurance intervals. The optimal months to insure varied in
each county. In the North Cache County optimal intervals to insure are June-July and
August-September. In central Utah Duchesne County optimal intervals to insure are AprilMay and October-November. In the East Sanpete County optimal intervals are May-June
and August-September. Finally, in the West, Beaver County optimal intervals to insure are
primarily March-April and July-August. Results indicate that producers in Utah would
likely benefit from enrolling in the Rainfall Index for Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage
insurance.
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INTRODUCTION

From the inception of the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) in the 1930’s to the
2000’s, demand for crop insurance has remained low (Glauber et al., 2002). In an attempt
to curb disaster relief spending, Congress sought to encourage participation in the FCIP
(Glauber et al., 2002). Bills were passed to reform the program in 1980, 1994, and 2000,
and further Farm Bill amendments in 2008, 2014, and 2018. The Agricultural Risk
Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000 established the major components of the crop insurance
program that are in place today. This includes increased federal premium subsidies, and
new insurance products that can be designed by private industry. Increased premium
subsidies has led to more participation in insurance programs. New, innovative, insurance
products have led to more options for producers who do not grow one of the major crops
(corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton).
Prior to the ARPA, producers favored other risk mitigation options and often chose
to forgo crop insurance altogether (Glauber et al., 2002). Other risk mitigation options
available to producers include enterprise diversification, vertical integration, production
contracts, marketing contracts, hedging in futures, future options contracts, maintain
financial reserves and leveraging, liquidity, leasing inputs, and hiring custom work. For a
full review of other risk mitigation options, see Harwood et al. (1999). Federal disaster
assistance is another potential risk mitigation tool available to producers.
Crop insurance participation rates stayed below 40% of eligible acreage until the
Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, when rates increased to above 60%, and sometimes
70%. Participation, premium, and subsidy rates from 1981 to 2001 are described in Table
I. Coverage levels were still relatively low, with less than 10% of enrolled acres in coverage
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levels above 65%. The passage of the ARPA in 2000 further increased participation rates,
and increased coverage levels. The increases were partially in response to the much higher
subsidy rates offered for higher coverage levels (Glauber et al., 2002). Research done by
Just, Calvin, and Quiggin (1999) demonstrated that the decision to participate in crop
insurance was usually driven by expected benefits rather than by risk aversion.

Table I. Federal crop insurance program, 1981-2001
Year

No. of
No. of
Policies
Acres
(1000s)
(millions)
1981 416.8
45
1982 386.0
42.7
1983 310.0
27.9
1984 389.8
42.7
1985 414.6
48.6
1986 406.9
48.7
1987 433.9
49.1
1988 461.0
55.6
1989 949.7
101.7
1990 893.7
101.3
1991 706.2
82.3
1992 663.1
83.1
1993 678.8
83.7
1994 800.4
99.4
1995 2,039.2 220.5
1996 1,623.3 204.9
1997 1,319.6 182.2
1998 1,242.4 181.8
1999 1,288.7 196.9
2000 1,322.8 206.3
2001 1,297.5 211.6
Source: Glauber et al. (2002)

Participation
Rate
16
15
12
16
18
20
22
25
40
40
33
31
32
38
41/85
44/76
43/67
46/69
53/73
59/76
63/78

Total
Premium
($ mil.)
376.8
396.1
285.8
433.9
439.8
379.7
365.1
436.4
819.4
835.5
736.4
758.7
755.6
948.9
1,543.00
1,838.40
1,773.80
1,874.20
2,309.70
2,538.70
2,959.30

Producer
Premium
($ Mil.)
329.8
304.8
222.1
335.6
339.7
291.6
277.5
328.4
613.1
620.5
546.5
562
555.6
694.1
653.8
856.4
872.3
928.4
918.4
1,191.40
1,189.10

Subsidy
Rate
12%
23%
22%
23%
23%
23%
24%
25%
25%
26%
26%
26%
26%
27%
58%
53%
51%
50%
60%
53%
60%
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The benefit provided by federal insurance subsidies has increasingly bolstered crop
insurance participation numbers. Crop insurance participation by the major crop producers
now above 80%, and producers are currently relying on crop insurance as their primary
safety net (USDA, 2015-2018). For producers who do not produce one of the major crops
(corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton), participation continues to remain relatively low
(Shields, 2015). This is in part due to the lack of insurance options for non-major crop
production.
One recent innovative insurance product made possible by ARPA and managed
within the FCIP is the rainfall-index for pasture, rangeland, and forage (RI-PRF) program.
This insurance option allows for the inclusion of more varied types of agricultural
production. RI-PRF was introduced, along with a vegetation index version, as pilot
programs in 2007. Vegetation index was replaced by rainfall index and was made available
for all 48 contiguous states by 2016. Enrollment in RI-PRF has steadily increased from 52
million acres in 2016, to 75 million in 2017, and again increased to 98 million in 2018.
However, this still only accounts for 15% of the 650 million acres of pasture and rangelands
in the United States. By contrast, the participation rate for corn was at 87%, and for cotton
was at 93% in 2012 (Shields, 2015).
The geographic distribution of crop insurance participation follows the geographic
distribution of crop production. Figure 1 illustrates this geographic distribution for 2012,
before the introduction of RI-PRF in most states. States that do not produce one of the four
major crops also do not have high FCIP participation rates, resulting in an unequal
distribution of federal subsidy dollars. Lusk (2017) demonstrated this disparity by
modeling the welfare benefits that would occur if premium subsidies were removed from
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the FCIP. Midwestern and Southern states, states which grow cotton, wheat, corn, and
soybeans, generally had a reduction in welfare from the loss of premium subsidies. Western
and Northeastern states had welfare gains from the removal of subsidies, under the
assumption that the tax dollars spent are returned to the taxpayers.
Utah, like other states in the Intermountain West, is dominated by livestock
production and has generally not benefited from insurance programs or federal premium
subsidy dollars. According to the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (2017),
the total production value of wheat and corn in Utah, the only major crops produced in
Utah, was at $41.8 million. The value of cattle and hay production, however, was $747.4
million in the same year.

Figure 1. Acres enrolled in crop insurance, 2012
Source: Congressional Research Service, Federal Crop Insurance: Background 2015
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The introduction of RI-PRF as an insurance option is beginning to change the
insurance program disparity between states based on type of agriculture produced. In 2014
Utah had a total of 183 thousand acres insured under any insurance program. By 2018, that
number increased to 5.19 million acres, only 81,000 of which was not RI-PRF. Figure 2
illustrates the limited number of acres in Utah that were insured prior to the introduction
of RI-PRF as an insurance option. The dramatic increase in acres insured is a result of the
growing awareness of this insurance option that is now available to livestock producers.
This paper will demonstrate the potential financial benefit of participation in RIPRF for producers in Utah. More participation in federal insurance programs would lead
to a more equitable distribution of federal subsidy dollars to rural communities in Western
states.
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4000000

3000000

2000000

1000000

0
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Other Insured Acres
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PRF Insured Acres

Figure 2. Acres insured in Utah, 2014 - 2018
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Risk Management Agency Summary of Business Report (20142018)
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This paper will focus on the selection of insurance intervals that will maximize
returns while appropriately managing risk. Previous research has done similar analysis for
South Dakota (Diersen et al., 2015), Oklahoma (Maples et al., 2016), and Nebraska
(Carlson et al., 2017). Utah has its own unique climate and growing seasons that require
local analysis; as Vedenov and Barnett (2004) explained, for index insurance to work,
analysis must be highly localized. Four counties in Utah will be analyzed. Counties were
selected for higher levels of animal agricultural production and geographic distribution in
the North, East, West, and Central regions of the state. The counties selected are Cache
(North), Duchesne (East), Beaver (West), and Sanpete (Central). Figure 3 illustrates the
locations of the four counties within the state of Utah.
Producers and insurance providers can gain a clearer understanding of the insurance
interval risks in the varied climates of the Utah high desert. The National Climate Data
Center has classified Utah into seven climate divisions (Figure 4). Six of the seven climate
divisions can be characterized as steppe or semi-arid under the Köppen-Geiger climate
classification system. Steppe or semi-arid climates are characterized by hot, dry summers,
cold winters, and average annual precipitation between 5 to 15 inches. Most precipitation
occurs during the winter months, with summer precipitation mostly a result of convective
thunderstorms near mountainous areas (Gillies and Ramsey, 2009).
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Figure 3. Location of four selected counties in Utah

Figure 4. The seven Utah climate zones
Source: Gillies and Ramsey, 2009
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Cache County is the only one of the four counties under review that is not
completely characterized as steppe or semi-arid. Likewise, Cache County has a higher
annual average precipitation than the other three counties at 18 inches per year. The other
three counties have an annual precipitation of 12 inches or less. Summary statistics for
annual precipitation in each county are listed in Table II.
Average monthly precipitation hovers around one inch, and never exceeds 2 inches
of precipitation in any of the reviewed counties. Additionally, variation can be significant,
for example, the month of September in Beaver, Duchesne, and Sanpete counties, will, at
times, receive no precipitation, however, that same month, on other years, can receive the
highest historical levels of precipitation for any given month (3.78 in Beaver and Duchesne,
and 5.29 in Sanpete). Variation is highest in the late summer and early fall, likely due to
the convective thunderstorm activity during that time of year.
Precipitation patterns in these Utah counties will affect expected indemnity
payments under RI-PRF. The implications of a low average and high variation is that one
big storm during any two-month interval could easily push total precipitation for that month
above the index threshold, even while the rest of the interval is dry. This conundrum may
only get worse with climate change.

Table II. County summary statistics of annual precipitation (inches)
Beaver
Average
Standard Deviation
Min
Max

Cache
9.8
2.26
4.88
15.06

17.49
4.41
8.48
32.92

Duchesne
Sanpete
8.17
12.11
2.11
2.72
2.36
6.63
12.84
21.29

Source: NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, Global Summary of the Month
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The Utah climate is unique in both the very low levels of average precipitation
(Utah is the second driest state in the country after Nevada), as well as the expected
impacts of climate change. Climate change predictions indicate that temperatures will
rise, evapotranspiration will increase, snowfall will decrease, but rainfall will increase
(EPA, 2016). Average precipitation in the three of the four surveyed counties in Utah has
been increasing over the last 70 years (Figure 5). Increased precipitation might result in a
lower probability of receiving indemnity payments while producers are facing higher
temperatures and greater evapotranspiration rates which could exceed the benefits of the
extra precipitation.
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Figure 5. Annual average precipitation trends for selected counties
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This paper proceeds as follows. First, a literature review covering risk in
agriculture, index insurance, and rainfall-index insurance specifically, followed by a
description of the RI-PRF program. The objectives of the paper are described. Then, the
data, and conceptual model are introduced with an empirical analysis. Findings are
presented and interpreted in the results section, with conclusions in the last section.
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PREVIOUS WORK – LITERATURE REVIEW

Risk in Agriculture
There are several different types of risk in agriculture, these risks include price/market,
yield/production, human/personal, institutional, and financial risk. Price/market risk can be
a result of changes to output price or input cost and are subject to a wide range of global
forces. Production/yield risk can be a result of weather variation, insect activity, disease,
or other natural forces, but is also subject to advancing technologies. Human/personal risk
is the risk of operators to death, divorce, injury, or poor health, and can also include loss
due to theft or business malpractice. Institutional risk is the varying of regulations or
policies that affect things such as land use, pesticide or animal drug use, as well as tax or
credit policy. Financial risk relates to problems with fluctuating interest rates or equity,
excess debt, or insufficient cash flow. While many of these risks are common to all business
owners, some are unique to agriculture, in particular yield/production risk (Harwood et al.,
1999).
Insurance is one of many options producers have to manage risk. Insurance can be
considered as a form of risk pooling and works because loss does not usually occur to the
combined group all at one time. This is not generally true of agriculture. Agricultural
producers will often experience loss in tandem. Fluctuating commodity prices affect all
growers in a uniform pattern, and yield loss frequently occurs over large geographic areas.
This is one of the reasons that a private insurance market for agricultural has not
independently developed. Arguments for government intervention in the crop insurance
market is due to this, and other, forms of market failure in the private crop insurance
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markets. A complete overview of government intervention in the crop insurance market
can be found in Glauber et al. (2002).
Disaster assistance offered by the federal government is another risk mitigation tool
that may potentially compete with federal crop insurance. The Livestock Forage Program
(LFP), for example, offers federal assistance payments following the effects of drought or
wildfire on grazing lands. This disaster program could potentially compete with RI-PRF
by offering relief after drought or wildfires that are partially caused by low rainfall. Carlson
(2017) analyzed the effects of charity hazard as it relates to LFP and RI-PRF. Charity
hazard is the opting not to enroll in insurance due to the presence of a disaster relief option.
Carlson (2017) could not conclusively determine whether or not charity hazard was present.
However, there was some evidence that receiving disaster assistance payments from LFP
resulted in higher RI-PRF enrollment. This result may be due to a greater awareness of RIPRF as an option after filing for LFP payments.
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Before the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 most insurance products depended
on actual farm level yield or revenue losses. These numbers can be difficult to track and
verify, and often lead to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Moral hazard
occurs when purchasing insurance lowers the incentive for producers to manage production
or incur costs that would result in higher yields, but lower indemnity payments (Glauber
2002). Adverse selection occurs when high-risk producers know they are high-risk, and
thus select higher coverage levels, receive more benefits, and are under-charged, while
low-risk producers are over-charged. This self-selection can cause insurance premiums to

13

rise over time and negatively impacts the low-risk producers and contributes to the
unsustainability of private insurance markets (Barret et al., 2007).
Basis Risk in Index Insurance
In 1991 Miranda revived the idea of an index insurance that was first proposed by Halcrow
in 1949. Index-based insurance promised to lower administrative costs, substantially
reduce the problem of adverse selection, and nearly eliminate moral hazard. The most
significant problem with index-based insurance products is basis risk. Basis risk is the
result of the index not actually correlating with farm level returns. High basis risk has been
shown to reduce demand for index insurance (Jensen, 2018). However, basis risk can be
lowered by good insurance design, better data, analyzes smaller areas, and accounts for
growing season variation, and other things (Clement, 2018; Barret et al. 2007). After the
1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act was passed, the first pilot programs for index
insurance began. Initially, pilot programs focused on an area-yield index but have since
moved to weather-based indices.
Weather Index Insurance
Turvey (2001) outlines the benefits and potential of a weather-based index insurance for
managing crop yield risk. Turvey identifies weather as a transparent and easily observed
index, overcoming potential adverse selection problems of average area yield index
insurance plans. Turvey found that corn and soybeans are more sensitive to temperature
while hay is more sensitive to rainfall. Turvey emphasized the need for payoff probabilities
to be highly localized, and efforts must be made to reduce basis risk. Vedenov and Barnett
(2004) analyzed weather derivatives as a risk management option for six districts
producing corn, cotton, and soybeans in the United States and also conclude that weather-

14

based index insurance contracts must be highly localized for optimal performance, and an
in-depth analysis for each crop/region should be performed. One method proposed by
Turvey (2001) for basis risk reduction would be to triangulate weather stations. This is the
method currently used by the RMA. Norton, Boucher, and Chiu (2015) then determined
that index insurance based on multiple weather station data does indeed reduce basis risk.
Despite these limitations, weather-based index insurance still possesses the advantage of
the ability to insure commodities that have difficult to measure yield, such as pasture and
rangelands (Barnett, 2004).
Rainfall Index Insurance
Nadolnyak and Vedenov (2013) determined that long-term climate forecasts can lead to
intertemporal adverse selection, when producers account for climate forecasts but insurers
do not, or, if insurers do account for climate forecasts, uninsurable risk that must be borne
by the producer. Ifft et al. (2014) concluded that RI-PRF insurance increases the value of
pasture land by about 4%. Muller et al. (2011) suggest that while rainfall index insurance
improves producer well-being, it also incentivizes less sustainable rangeland management.
They conclude that the insurance strike level should be set below the long-term average as
means of continuing producer benefits while improving sustainable practices.
Diesren, Gurung, and Fausti (2015) created an efficient frontier for insurance
interval selection in several counties in South Dakota. They concluded that the May-June
and July-August intervals are the most important for managing risk, and that enrolling in
PRF-RI coverage would produce higher returns, and lower risk, compared to not enrolling
in the insurance program. Allocation to the May-June and July-August intervals create a
lower variance portfolio that will realize greater returns in the long run. A maximum return
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portfolio would require selection of the November-December and September-October
intervals, but the risk is also relatively high with a standard deviation of $64, compared to
the standard deviation of the minimum variance portfolio at $22.
Maples, Brorsen, and Biermacher (2016) analyzed the Rainfall Index Annual
Forage Program (RIAFP) pilot in Oklahoma. Maples et al. concluded that participating in
the RIAFP would also produce higher returns than not participating, similar to Diersen’s
conclusion that PRF-RI increases returns. In both cases the higher returns are primarily due
to the high rates of premium subsidies. Unlike Diersen et al., Maples et al. looked at actual
yield risk protection provided by the RIAFP. While the RIAFP is accurately correlated
with precipitation, precipitation was found to not correlate with actual annual forage
production. Maples et al. noted, however, that results may differ in drier regions of the
West. Maples et al. also recommended that the RMA add additional insurance intervals
that might correlate better with annual forage production growing and harvest periods.
Carlson et al. (2017), opposingly, did not consider regional variations, and
concluded that the RMA should remove certain interval options that were found to increase
a producer’s risk. Carlson et al. analyzed the selection of insurance intervals using six
different insurance scenarios in two locations in Nebraska. Months were categorized into
low, medium, and high precipitation months, and insuring against low precipitation months
was determined to increase risk. Additionally, a scenario where both low and high
precipitation months are insured was the profit maximizing scenario in one location but
was also high risk. While eliminating low precipitation months as insurance interval
options for Nebraska might be a prudent option, other regions in the United States will
likely have different outcomes.
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RI-PRF PROGRAM

Rainfall Index for Pasture Rangeland and Forage (RI-PRF) is intended to insure producers
of perennial forage land against a single peril, precipitation. While the name of the
insurance program includes the term “rainfall,” it actually refers to all forms of
precipitation. RI-PRF is not intended to insure against drought, only a comparative
decrease in the level of precipitation. Precipitation is measured by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration Climate Prediction Center (NOAA CPC) which uses a
grid system to determine precipitation within a particular area. The grid is 0.25 degrees in
latitude by 0.25 degrees longitude, approximately 17 by 17 miles at the equator. An
expected grid index is calculated for each grid and index interval using long-term, historical,
gridded precipitation data that is interpolated and cannot be traced back to a single
reporting station (USDA-RMA). Each producer must determine which grid their acreage
is located in. Producers must also select a coverage level, productivity factor, and index
intervals.
Coverage levels are chosen from 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, or 90%. Coverage level
also determines the federal subsidy rate. The rate is 59% of the premium for the 70% and
75% levels, 55% for the 80% and 85% levels, and 51% for the 90% level. Productivity
factor allows producers to adjust their particular forage value in 1% increments from 60%
to 150% of country base value. There are eleven two-month index insurance intervals in
the calendar year: January-February, February-March, March-April, April-May, May-June,
June-July, July-August, August-September, September-October, October-November, and
November-December. Producers must insure at least two intervals, and intervals cannot
overlap, resulting in a maximum of six intervals that can be selected. Intervals are weighted
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with a minimum weight of 10% and a maximum weight of 60% requiring the sum of
weights to add up to 100%.
Indemnities are paid if the precipitation for the selected interval or intervals are less
than the historical average at the selected coverage level. The amount of the indemnity is
determined by the level of deviation from the historical mean, the coverage level, and the
policy protection per unit.
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 (1)

The payment calculation factor calculates the difference between the historical

mean at the predetermined coverage level, or the trigger grid index and the final grid index.
The trigger grid index is equal to the coverage level multiplied by the expected grid index.
The expected grid index is the NOAA CPC interpolated historical gridded precipitation or
successor data and expressed as a percentage with mean equal to 100. The final grid index
is the NOAA CPC interpolated gridded current year precipitation data.
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 =

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
> 0 (2)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Policy protection per unit is determined by the number of insured acres, the
producer share, and the dollar amount of protection.
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢

= 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 × $ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

Dollar amount of protection is the country base value multiplied by the
productivity factor and coverage level.

(3)
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$ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

= 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙

(4)
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OBJECTIVES

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the potential value of enrolling in RI-PRF for
producers in Utah. This paper will assist extension agents and producers in better
understanding the risks and risk mitigation options available in one of the driest regions of
the United States.
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DATA

Statistical precipitation data for the four counties was gathered from NOAA Climate Data
Online. Averages were compiled from two to four weather stations near the grid chosen
for each county from 1950 to 2017. Cache County had the highest levels of precipitation
followed by Sanpete County. Beaver and Duchesne Counties had very similar levels of
precipitation, and similar precipitation patterns. All counties have had a steep decline in
precipitation during the summer months of June and July, while more precipitation has
generally occurred during the spring months of March and April. Periods of greatest
variation have occurred during the months of September and October. Summary statistics
are reported in Table III, with a color scale for ease of identifying highs and lows.
Data used for the optimization model were gathered from the USDA Risk
Management Agency Decision Support Tool. Historical rainfall indices, and premium rates,
are variable for each county. Premium rates per $100 for all intervals and counties are
reported in Table IV. Highest rates for Beaver county are the during the October-November,
September-October, and May-June intervals. Lowest rates for Beaver County are during
the March-April, and February-March intervals. Highest rates for Cache County are during
the July-August, and August-September intervals. Lowest rates for Cache County are
during the March-April, and April-May intervals. Highest rates for Duchesne County are
during the October-November, and November-December intervals. Lowest rates for
Duchesne County are during the July-August, and February-March intervals. The highest
rate for Sanpete County is during the May-June interval. The lowest rate for Sanpete
County is during the March-April interval.
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Table III. Average monthly precipitation summary statistics

Mean
St Dev
Max
Min

Mean
St Dev
Max
Min

Mean
St Dev
Max
Min

Mean
St Dev
Max
Min

Beaver County
Jan
Feb
Mar Apr
May Jun
Jul
Aug
0.68 0.76 1.06 0.96
0.83 0.47 0.84 1.00
0.48 0.51 0.60 0.54
0.60 0.46 0.60 0.74
2.00 2.06 3.10 2.43
2.62 1.89 2.37 3.61
0.08 0.00 0.01 0.06
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Cache County
Jan
Feb
Mar Apr
May Jun
Jul
Aug
1.64 1.46 1.75 1.96
2.00 1.30 0.59 0.84
1.12 0.93 0.89 0.99
1.15 1.00 0.59 0.93
5.20 5.38 4.14 5.38
5.47 4.47 2.47 4.74
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.38
0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00
Duchesne County
Jan
Feb
Mar Apr
May Jun
Jul
Aug
0.70 0.71 1.06 0.91
0.80 0.53 0.84 1.05
0.45 0.46 0.72 0.56
0.67 0.48 0.62 0.86
2.00 2.06 3.10 2.43
2.62 1.89 2.37 3.61
0.08 0.00 0.01 0.06
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Sanpete County
Jan
Feb
Mar Apr
May Jun
Jul
Aug
1.04 1.04 1.15 1.20
1.17 0.70 0.73 0.87
0.68 0.73 0.64 0.66
0.80 0.62 0.48 0.48
2.86 3.74 2.98 3.37
3.53 2.77 2.15 2.24
0.11 0.09 0.02 0.10
0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05

Sep
Oct
Nov Dec
0.84 0.95 0.68 0.72
0.83 0.79 0.44 0.57
3.78 3.70 1.81 2.70
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Sep
Oct
Nov Dec
1.29 1.57 1.51 1.55
1.18 1.07 0.95 1.00
5.16 4.62 4.93 5.19
0.02 0.00 0.03 0.08
Sep
Oct
Nov Dec
0.93 1.12 0.65 0.81
0.98 0.97 0.45 0.65
3.78 3.70 1.81 2.70
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Sep
Oct
Nov Dec
1.11 1.06 0.99 1.13
0.92 0.76 0.62 0.82
5.29 3.66 3.03 4.97
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04

Source: NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, Global Summary of the Month

Table IV. Insurance premiums for selected counties
County Base Value
Dollar Amount of Protection
Interval
Jan-Feb
Feb-Mar
Mar-Apr
Apr-May
May-Jun
Jun-Jul
Jul-Aug
Aug-Sep
Sep-Oct
Oct-Nov
Nov-Dec

Beaver
Cache
Duchesne Sanpete
7.4
7.4
3.6
5.6
6.66
6.66
3.24
5.04
Premium Rate Per $100
18.56
17.58
24.30
20.77
15.75
17.94
18.93
16.99
14.72
13.97
19.35
13.65
18.93
14.32
22.79
17.48
24.37
18.13
24.97
22.34
22.26
22.87
22.87
20.12
17.00
26.27
18.42
16.57
23.70
25.75
20.05
20.27
24.39
21.27
23.24
20.38
25.25
17.98
25.99
19.53
21.24
20.08
25.46
18.67
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METHODS

A stochastic optimization model was developed using Palisade’s @Risk software.
Optimization refers to the optimal allocation of resources under a set of constraints to
achieve the best desired outcome. Mathematical programming is the mathematical
approach to this problem and is frequently used in a variety of decision making applications.
In this paper, mathematical programming is used to facilitate the decision making
associated with selecting insurance intervals to maximize returns. Therefore, the desired
outcome, or objective, is to maximize the insurance indemnity returns, less premiums paid.
This is termed the objective function of the mathematical programming model. The
formula for the objective function used in this paper is listed in equations (1) through (4).
The objective function is a function of coverage level, insured acres, producer
share, productivity factor, county base value, trigger grid index, premium rates, and final
grid index. All variables are deterministic with the exception of the final grid index for
simplicity. The coverage level, insured acres, producer share, and productivity factor are
constant for all counties. The coverage level is 90 percent, the acres insured is 1000 acres,
the producer share is 100 percent, and there is a 100 percent productivity factor. The
county base value is determined by county. The trigger grid index is dependent on
coverage level selected, 90 percent for this model. Premium rates varied by each county
and each interval. The final grid index is stochastic and is determined by historical
averages.
Stochastic optimization uses Monte Carlo simulation to incorporate risk into the
optimization model. A Monte Carlo simulation allows problems that might otherwise be
deterministic to become stochastic through sampling hundreds or thousands of random
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draws from a probability distribution. Probability distributions can come in many different
forms and are either univariate or multivariate. The probability distributions used in this
model were determined using the historical weather averages available through RMA. The
batch fit function in @Risk was used to create a distribution for each insurance interval,
allowing the data to determine a multivariate distribution with the best distribution fit for
each insurance interval. This process was completed separately for each county. The final
grid index, a component of equation (2), becomes a stochastic variable in the model and
was simulated for 1000 iterations for each county. This simulates the likelihood of
precipitation that can occur in each region and for each two-month insurance interval.
Allowing us to better understand the range of possible outcomes.
The resource allocation occurring in this model is the percent allocation given to
what insurance interval. This is the variable cells of the model, or the solution that the
optimization model will determine. The percent allocation is subject to constraints, as are
all resources. The first constraint is that the percent allocated to each insurance interval
must equal 100 percent. The second constraint is that at least two intervals must be
selected, this constraint is imposed by allowing no more than a 60 percent allocation to
any one insurance interval. The third constraint is that no two intervals in a row can be
selected.
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RESULTS

The results for the optimal selection of insurance intervals are listed in Table 5. Beaver
County was the only county that did not have a 60/40 split in the allocation between
insurance intervals. There does not appear to be any overarching pattern to the results
between counties. This is likely due to the different premium rates that have already been
adjusted for precipitation variation and patterns. The optimal allocation for Beaver
County was 60 percent in the March-April interval, 38 percent in the July-August
interval, and 1 percent in both the September-October and November-December
intervals.

Table V. Optimization results, percent allocation
Interval
Jan-Feb
Feb-Mar
Mar-Apr
Apr-May
May-Jun
Jun-Jul
Jul-Aug
Aug-Sep
Sep-Oct
Oct-Nov
Nov-Dec

Beaver

Cache

Duchesne

Sanpete

0.6
0.6
0.4
0.6
0.38
0.4

0.6

0.01
0.4
0.01

The summary statistics are listed in Table 6. Beaver County was also unique with
a much higher mean, standard deviation, and maximum than the other three counties. The
mean for Beaver County was 3,954 dollars. This amount is the indemnity payment above
premium paid for 1000 acreage of coverage. The next highest in Cache County at $835.
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The standard deviation for Beaver was $3,655, and the maximum was $20,006. Cache
County again had the next highest standard deviation of $1,518, and maximum of $5,203.
The minimum for Beaver County was not, however, the lowest at $-514. Both Cache
County at $-784, and Sanpete County at $-521, had lower minimums. Duchesne County
had the lowest average return at $374. Duchesne also had the lowest standard deviation,
$706, and the lowest minimum, $-382. While a high standard deviation often indicates
greater risk, in these scenarios the maximum risk can only reach the amount of premium
dollars paid. Therefore, a high standard deviation is not necessarily indicative of higher
risk.

Table VI. Optimization results summary statistics (US dollar)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Min
Max

Beaver
Cache
Duchesne Sanpete
3,953.75
835
374.24
427.74
3,654.74
1,518.32
706.44
870.02
-513.93
-783.93
-382.14
-521.04
20,005.98
5,203.06
2,385.81
3,403.61

The cumulative distribution functions of the results are displayed in Figure 6. The
probability distribution functions are displayed in Figures 7 through 10. The x-axis for all
graphs is the dollar amount of indemnity payments. The cumulative distribution function
overlays the probabilities of returns for each county. The cumulative distribution function
graphically displays the probability of all possible returns. All counties have a greater
than 60 percent chance of a return that is break even or better.
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Figure 6. Cumulative distribution functions of results
Note: The cumulative distribution function displays the probability of indemnity returns above zero for the
selected counties.

The probability distribution functions display the same information in a slightly
different format. The height of each bar represents the probability of receiving that return
amount. Beaver County has the highest probability of a positive return, with a less than
16 percent likelihood of a negative return. Duchesne and Sanpete counties are the most
likely to result in negative returns at 39.4 percent and 39.9 percent respectively. While
the probability of a positive return is high, there is still risk involved and producers
should exercise caution when making their selections.
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Figure 7. Probability distribution function, Beaver County
Note: The probability distribution function displays the probability of indemnity returns above zero for the
selected county.
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Figure 8. Probability distribution function, Cache County
Note: The probability distribution function displays the probability of indemnity returns above zero for the
selected county.
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Figure 9. Probability distribution function, Duchesne County
Note: The probability distribution function displays the probability of indemnity returns above zero for the
selected county.
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Figure 10. Probability distribution function, Sanpete County
Note: The probability distribution function displays the probability of indemnity returns above zero for the
selected county.
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CONCLUSION

The objective of this paper was to demonstrate the potential value in enrolling in RI-PRF
insurance for Utah producers. A stochastic optimization model was used to determine the
maximum returns possible when enrolling in this type of insurance. Four counties were
selected for analysis. Each county had high possible returns over premiums paid with an
average of $3,954 for Beaver County, $834 for Cache County, $374 for Duchesne
County, and $428 for Sanpete County. All counties had a greater than 60% chance of
receiving positive returns.
The implications of this research are that risk neutral producers should consider
enrolling in RI-PRF insurance given the expected returns. Producers should carefully
consider which insurance intervals to select when enrolling in this insurance. To maximize
returns this paper recommends selecting the insurance intervals described in the results
section. This paper does not consider alternative options that may be preferable to risk
averse producers. Further research could pursue this question.
Further research could also incorporate more counties to assess financial returns
elsewhere in the state. Additionally, further research could analyze long term climate
trends and the effects this will have on the risk producers will face and if rainfall index
insurance is a viable tool for mitigating climate risk long term.
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